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The improvement paradox in project contexts: a clue to the way forward?
“Paradoxes are like the weather, something to be lived with, not solved, the worst aspects
mitigated, the best enjoyed and used as clues to the way forward”
Charles Handy, The Empty Raincoat, 1994
Abstract
This paper emerged as the authors struggled to make sense of a phenomenon observed
during fieldwork. We had entered the field knowing a project-based organisation to be
performing poorly and to be in need of improvement in its management of projects. We
expected that the organisation would be actively trying to achieve the necessary
improvement. We found that the organisation as a matter of course was not pursuing any
improvement activities. It was only following a crisis with its major client that limited
changes were introduced, and then business as usual resumed. This we have termed, the
improvement paradox.
The paradox exists because there are two systems of logic operating: that of the researcher
in forming the expectation of change and that of the organisation in not changing. Both of
these systems provided insight. Our expectations reflected a bias for the logic that there
was inherent goodness and desirability in improving PM practices. Furthermore, we are
actors in an environment that actively promotes improvement and provides mimetic,
coercive and normative pressures on an organisation to improve. The logic of the
organisation was founded on complicity – between the organisation and its client, and
between multiple levels of the organisation. This complicity was seen to be causal in
maintaining a series of defensive routines – routines that perpetuated the status quo.
Further reflection revealed many paradoxes in the world of projects and project
management. Given the prevalence of paradoxes perhaps we should move beyond labelling
2these phenomena to explore them more deeply and to contribute insights which better
reflect the complexity and ambiguity in project contexts.
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Introduction
The idea for this paper emerged over a period of three years during which the authors
struggled to make sense of a phenomenon they had observed in the course of some
fieldwork. A few years ago, we were conducting some case study research on the value of
project management in a project-based organisation that was contracted to design, develop
and produce a major piece of military hardware, when we observed something we thought
was strange at the time – the long-standing non-adoption of some basic project
management practices and techniques that would have been beneficial, followed by the
subsequent adoption of one well-established technique being acclaimed throughout the
organisation as ‘best practice’.
We tried to analyse this phenomenon using a variety of theoretical lenses – none of which
could satisfactorily explain what we had observed. We then attempted to construct our own
theorisation of the phenomenon, which we called ‘complicity theory’ because the
phenomenon was only allowed to persist because of the complicity between the organisation
and its major customer and between multiple levels of the organisation. But our theory of
complicity proved to be very narrow in context – it is only useful where complicity exists.
Where it is absent there is no need for the theory.
3We compared our original case study with another ongoing major project where many best
practice/accepted/promising practices had been adopted – the construction of Heathrow’s
Terminal 5. At the time this was heralded as a great success and an example of a
breakthrough in project management. However, a year later the terminal opening was
described as a national disaster when multiple problems emerged that resulted in the
cancellation of numerous flights and thousands of pieces of baggage being separated from
their owners. So here was another paradox: how does a major success become a major
failure almost overnight?
The paradoxes highlighted above are just two examples of the many paradoxes in the world
of projects and project management that researchers and practitioners in the domain have
identified. We realised that by focussing too narrowly on specific examples of paradox we
could only develop theories of limited scope. Given the prevalence of paradoxes in the world
of projects perhaps we should move beyond labelling these phenomena to explore them and
to contribute insights “more in tune with organisational complexity and ambiguity” (Lewis,
2000). We suggest that as researchers of projects and project management we should pay
more attention “to the opportunities offered by tensions, oppositions, and contradictions
among explanations of the same phenomenon” (Poole and Van de Ven, 1989, 562) to help
build theories of project management and project organising.
The Improvement Paradox
The Oxford English Dictionary defines a paradox as:
“A seemingly absurd or contradictory statement or proposition which when investigated may
prove to be well founded or true; a statement or proposition which, despite sound (or
apparently sound) reasoning from acceptable premises, leads to a conclusion that seems
4logically unacceptable or self-contradictory; a person or thing that combines contradictory
features or qualities.”
Harvey (1988) citing Rapaport and Chammah (1970), notes that:
“Paradoxes are only paradoxes because they are based on a logic or rationale that is
different from what we understand or expect. Discovering the aberrant logic not only
destroys the paradoxical quality, but also offers alternative ways for coping with similar
situations.” (Harvey, 1988, p.20).
As Poole and Van de Ven (1989) state:
“Most contemporary theory construction methodologies attempt to build internally
consistent theories of limited scope. Relatively little attention has been paid to the
opportunities offered by the tension, oppositions, and contradictions among
explanations of the same phenomenon.” (p562)
They go on to distinguish four ways of working with paradox: (1) accept the paradox and use
it constructively; (2) clarify levels of analysis; (3) temporally separate the two levels; and (4)
introduce new terms to resolve the paradox.
Elsewhere, it has been suggested that significant advances in management and
organisation theory might require us to better address paradoxes inherent in human
behaviour and their social organisations (Cameron and Quinn, 1988). Lewis (2000) cites a
growing number of researchers (e.g. Handy, 1994; Kets de Vries, 1995; Koot, Sabelis and
Ybema, 1996; Hatch & Erlich, 1993; and Vince & Broussine, 1996) who have studied
paradox. She notes that these researchers have abandoned the idea that change is a
smooth, linear and planned journey. Rather they point out that contradictions both hamper
and encourage organisational development. Lewis laments the fact that whilst the term is
used by many in management research to the extent that it is in danger of becoming a
5cliché, few researchers explore paradox at greater depth.
She constructs a framework based on insights from psychology, philosophy and
organisational studies around this to help understand key elements of paradox. She claims
the framework clarifies: (1) how paradoxical tensions arise from polarised cognitive or social
constructions, (2) how actors’ defensive reactions might fuel reinforcing cycles, and (3) how
actors can avoid becoming stuck in these paralysing and often vicious cycles via greater
cognitive and behavioural complexity. She notes that formal logic is based on either/or
thinking which is incapable of understanding the intricacies of paradox (Ford and Ford,
1994).
For the case we present here, there is a clear difference between our expectations and the
reality of practice. The logic of our expectations was based on what we now recognise as a
bias of our research. That is, there is a fundamental goodness and desirability of improving
PM practices. Indeed, the work took place under the heading of ‘The Value of Project
Management.’ Our finding, that improvement was neither rationalised as good nor inherently
desirable clearly presented a paradox for us – the improvement paradox.
Summary of the observed phenomenon
The project we studied was to design, develop and eventually manufacture a new piece of
military hardware. Right from the outset in 1996, it was subject to continual slippage and
cost escalation. Just two years later the contractor informed the client that it was unlikely to
meet timescales and a revised in-service date was agreed for March 2005. There followed a
series of renegotiations of the contract terms as both sides revised their expectations for the
project and introduced new approaches. By May 2002, for example, a new incremental
6approach to product delivery was adopted, that reflected a revised assessment of operations
requirements. By the end of the year further slippage in both budget and time was disclosed
by the contractor attributed to the underestimation of technology risks, which placed them
under severe ‘cost pressures,’ making further contract negotiation necessary. The first full
product test date was moved back from mid-2002 to end 2002, then to the second half of
2003. The situation failed to improve despite a plethora of advice resulting from 11 separate
reviews that presented 255 issues to the management team. An independent audit report on
the project described the situation as follows:
“Difficulties on (the X project) stem from ‘the design challenge being hugely
underestimated by industry, perhaps as a result of continuing to see the project as if
it were the adaptation of an existing [product], as it was originally intended to be,
when in fact 95% of the [product] is new.”
“Against the background of the fixed price contract, the consequent cost pressure
and financial losses provided little incentive on (the contractor) to deliver. These
difficulties were compounded by a weak programme management culture which
lacked transparency, neglected or overrode project control systems and disciplines,
and produced forecasts that lacked depth and reality.”
The effect of this was to throw the project into complete crisis and in 2003 the two parties
agreed, in effect, to draw a line under it and come to a new agreement, which accepted the
slippage (by then 71 months) and agreed to share the costs between the two parties. The
contract was in effect re-baselined and a new contract negotiated. New revised agreed
milestones were introduced – first complete test June 2004; award of manufacturing contract
end 2005; in-service date 2009.
Evidence of practices within the organisation prior to 2003 included comments that:
7“The client was worried about performance. The company was worried about cost.
No-one worried about schedule.”
Given the continuing delays, this was key to the idea of collusion – each party trying to
protect its own interests, whilst missing one of the major issues that was central to the
overall success of the project.
Similarly, much attention was given to the prevailing ‘technical’ culture, where the focus was
on achieving technical excellence rather than meeting the needs of a business case:
“We had basic [project management] mechanisms but the ‘culture’ was not there. I
was fairly typical of managers who were not concerned with business case – just did
numbers to save getting ******** by the boss… We used to aim to surpass
customers’ expectations – regardless of whether he wanted the features and the
gold-plating.”
Project managers described the climate at the time as follows:
“It was a terrible place to work – there was fear, the project was a dead duck and
morale was very low.”
and
“The programme was out of control – people weren’t being true to each other about
what could be achieved – either in our own organisation or the customer’s
organisation. We both wanted to understand that – that was as much of a driver as
the performance itself.”
The organisation responded by initiating no fewer than 11 separate audits and reviews of the
project, which required over 170 high-level actions for management. This, initially, slowed
8progress even further; paradoxical in the short-term, but not the main issue of interest to this
discussion.
As a result of the restructuring of the contract, development, manufacture and service
contracts were separated out and project reforms were introduced. These project reforms
included more openness with the client, collocation of staff, introduction of ‘anchor
milestones’ as key progress check points, a joint risk register, and Earned Value (EV).
These reforms were embedded in a robust and open partnering approach that improved
access, information, communication and behaviours, and placed a greater emphasis on
delivery, cost minimisation and schedule adherence. One manager stated the benefits of this
as:
“We now have control and predictability and can understand cause and effect in the
schedule. The customer particularly likes that. We used to be cheesed off about his
requirements constantly changing. It [the new approach] reduces flexibility but is
now easier as you can show the effects of particular changes. Planning becomes a
heuristic tool as there are knock-on effects.”
In addition, the organisation put in place a behavioural programme, which aimed to
legitimise and professionalise project management in addition to a leadership development
programme and partnering development programme. However, the changes were relatively
straightforward. One manager commented:
“Our objective was very simple – we needed conformance to a fairly basic level of
proceduralisation.”
Within the contractor's company the reform programme is held up as a great success. The
project is now seen as exemplifying ‘good’ or ‘best’ practice throughout the parent
organisation. A prime outcome of the reforms is that the project is no longer under threat of
closure. The company retained the business and the project has now has fallen ‘below the
radar’ with the client. The relationship with the client is much better. Planning disciplines
9have been implemented. People working on the project appear motivated and confident in
both the product and the new processes.
However, if you scratch below the surface, there is very little critique of what has been
achieved in comparison to external benchmarks. We found very low levels of knowledge and
certification in the firm. Management qualifications were not recognised as valuable (there
was one MBA among several thousand staff). The customer was similarly
(un)knowledgeable. In PM maturity terms, they have moved from chaotic to the use of some
basic processes. More surprisingly, there is no desire or requirement for ongoing
improvement:
“I don’t believe we’ll move the bar much beyond where it has gone already.”
“We won’t spend any more money on comparing a good programme with a bad
programme – we’ll send them out into the hinterland as disciples and bring in more
junior people to train up.” (Project Director).
and, despite the reforms, the project still showed both schedule and costs increasing (albeit
at a slower rate than before). However, the complicity in stagnating performance was well
established in the organisation again. Data from the 21 project managers surveyed showed
that:
 15 of the 21 agreed and 1 strongly agreed with the statement that they were well
trained (5 neutral).
 14 of the 21 agreed and 2 strongly agreed with the statement that they had suitable
education to fulfil their jobs (5 neutral).
 12 of the 21 agreed and 3 strongly agreed that management provides advanced
development and training programmes for members of the organisation.
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This was despite the fact that there was not a single recognised (APM/PMI) qualification
among the 180 project office staff. We interpret this difference as a form of collusion.
Further, this was reflected in the views of the organisational PM capability:
 14 of the 21 agreed and 2 strongly agreed with the statement that the organisation is
viewed as having a very strong management capability (3 neutral and 2 disagreed).
 11 agreed and 7 strongly agreed that the organisation had very high PM standards.
 15 agreed and 2 strongly agreed that this organisation has superior project
management practices.
The benchmark here was taken as knowledge of the bodies of knowledge (APM/PMI). Not
one of the interviewees demonstrated such knowledge. The last statement provides another
interesting contrast with the performance that the project was again demonstrating. On the
subject of performance:
 Only 5 agreed that the project management practices of the organisation consistently
exceed expectations (14 neutral and 2 disagreed).
The self-delusion of the project members was evidenced by:
 8 agreeing and 2 strongly agreeing with the statement that ‘Projects in this
organisation are more successful than in other organisations I know’ (9 were neutral
and 2 disagreed).
 12 agreeing and 5 strongly agreeing that the organisation delivered high quality
products and services
 12 agreeing and 2 strongly agreeing that projects were successfully delivered
 12 agreeing (5 neutral, 4 disagreeing) that projects managed by the organisation
consistently deliver on their objectives
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However, when broken down we see that this was mostly in terms of technical
specifications:
 11 agreed and 2 strongly agreed that projects achieved their technical objectives.
Whereas:
 only 5 agreed that they met their schedule objectives (10 disagreed and 1 strongly
disagreed).
 9 disagreed, 1 strongly disagreed that they met budget objectives.
In relation to their opinion of the clients’ view of projects:
 11 agreed and 10 were neutral in relation to the statement: clients are consistently
satisfied by the process by which projects are managed.
Whilst it can be argued ‘who is the client’ here, the client itself had no reason to be satisfied
with a renegotiated and very late project that was continuing to slip.
Overall, what we witnessed was complicity between the client and the contractor (just stay
out of the press), propped up by complicity within the contracting organisation (it is a good
news story), and complicity in the project team (we are well qualified, knowledgeable and
doing well). The result is that poor processes and poor performance were allowed to
continue with no obvious requirement for improvement.
What theory could help explain this phenomenon?
We puzzled over this phenomenon and tried to analyse it using a variety of theoretical
lenses. These were not intended to be an exhaustive selection, but are illustrative of some
approaches that we hoped would enlighten the phenomenon of interest. This is the
difference between our expectations (poor performance leading to improvements being
actively pursued) and the reality of the case (performance condoned leading to no further
improvements sought). These lenses were innovation diffusion theory, rational choice
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theory, institutional theory (including the fads and fashions literature), and organisational
learning.
Innovation diffusion theory
Diffusion theory concerns the role adopted by different actors – whether early adopters or
laggards (e.g. Rogers 1983). The first phase of the diffusion of an innovative practice sees it
adopted by relatively few innovators – the early adopters. Once the efficacy of the practice is
demonstrated by these early adopters it is taken up by other organisations and so diffuses
more generally over time until it becomes standard practice. What we observed above does
not seem to fit easily with this since the organisation in question spent many years avoiding
taking up the good practice that had already diffused widely in other project settings (both in
other parts of the organisation and more widely). In order for new practices to be adopted
they must first be found in some kind of search activity. It appears that there was little
attempt to search out better practice until the major crisis in 2003 when the threat of
programme closure forced them to seek alternatives. Once these were implemented,
however, there was no further change. Perhaps the actors in the case organisation could
simply be viewed as laggards, but this is not necessarily helpful in explaining the full range
of behaviours.
Institutional theory would suggest that organisations in the same industry exhibit
isomorphism – i.e. they will adopt similar working practices (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). On
the one hand diffusion of practices seen as best practice takes place encouraged by the
legitimacy argument. The introduction of earned value by the project organisation was
legitimised by the widespread and successful use of the technique in the company’s US
business. Furthermore, a new manager, who had previously worked in the US business,
was appointed to oversee the changes. On the other hand, the benefits achieved by the
adoption of successful practice may inhibit the take up of superior practices in the future
(Arthur, 1989). In this case, the non-adoption of superior practice in the future is not so much
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a result of the successful adoption of the EV technique but a deliberate strategy not to go
beyond what has already been achieved.
At the level of the organisation some practices become institutionalised as rules – ‘the way
we do things around here.’ Such practices become embedded and are very resistant to
change (Oliver,1992). It appears that the new ‘good practice’ had become institutionalised
as a rule in the organisation and hence will be hard to change in the future.
Rational choice
Rational choice approaches to the adoption of new practices and their impact on
performance, include the behavioural theory of the firm (e.g. Cyert & March 1963; March &
Simon 1967) and evolutionary economics (e.g. Nelson & Winter 1982). These suggest that
the primary driver for organisational innovations is the identification of performance gaps.
When a firm’s actual performance drops below its desired performance level, determined
either internally by past performance or internal targets (e.g. Lant & Mezias 1992) or by
comparison to an external reference group (e.g. Massini et al 2005), this performance gap
will lead managers to search for new practices to improve performance. Once the new
practice has been adopted and put into use, managers will compare before-and-after
performance to determine whether it should be retained or discarded. Thus, rational choice
presents the identification, selection, evaluation, and retention or discarding of management
practices as relatively straightforward for managers, who should thus be viewed as rational
actors who search for new practices to maintain or improve organisational performance.
This clearly has not happened in our case study organisation except when forced. The
project was performing poorly for many years (problems identified in 1998 through to final
melt-down in 2003) before any change was implemented. Furthermore, despite the
opportunity for further improvement, none was taken.
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The improvement paradox relies not on one rationality, but more than one to be present.
Whilst there was logic in our expectation, it clearly wasn’t the same logic as that used by the
managers in the case company. The people interviewed were all highly rational individuals,
who exhibited a highly developed sense of professionalism. We are not then able to reject
rational choice theory. Rather, the theory needs qualification for this context to provide any
useful explanatory power.
The institutional approach
An alternative perspective to rational choice is the institutional approach, which derives from
sociology, and shifts the main focus of attention from rational choice and technical efficiency
to pressures from the organisation’s external environment (e.g. Dimaggio and Powell 1983).
The institutional approach views all economic activity as embedded in social contexts. Whilst
firms may aspire to rational solutions to performance gaps, because of uncertainty about
competing practices and performance outcomes or alternative practices that might plausibly
achieve the same outcomes, they may be uncertain how to achieve them. So that managers
appear rational and progressive according to “norms of rationality” (March & Olsen, 1976),
they will tend to adopt institutionalised organisational practices, those “taken-for-granted” as
the most appropriate means of improving performance, and hence perceived as legitimate
by key institutional actors (e.g. Abrahamson, 1996).
From an institutional perspective, the explanations accompanying the adoption of a new
practice become important because explaining how the practice helps managers achieve the
desired performance outcomes legitimises the practice (Green, 2004) and is essential to
constructing certain practices as “taken for granted” (e.g. Green, 2004; Suddaby &
Greenwood, 2005). Hence, a focus on managerial discourse often accompanies an
institutional analysis of diffusion and adoption of management innovations. The
management fashion perspective (e.g. Abrahamson, 1991; Abrahamson, 1996; Abrahamson
& Fairchild, 1997; Strang & Macy, 2001; Strang & Still, 2004) focuses particularly on the role
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of rhetoric and social networks in the diffusion of new practices, and the presence of
“bandwagons”, or the number of adopters (e.g. Abrahamson & Rosenkopf, 1997). Managers
must therefore heed key institutional actors, including consulting firms, management gurus,
business mass-media publications, and business schools, who provide important sources of
information for managers about what other firms are doing. On this last point, there is an
underlying assumption that managers are being exposed to these ‘key institutional actors.’
In the case, the managers appeared insulated from what other firms were doing, inhibiting
any ‘search’ for improvement opportunities.
Institutional theory further specifies that the diffusion and adoption of management practices
will be influenced by mimetic, coercive, and normative pressures from the external
environment (e.g. Scott, 2001) to adopt certain practices. Mimetic pressures are pressures
for firms to imitate the practices of other, usually successful, firms; coercive pressures are
pressures to avoid sanctions from regulatory agencies and other institutional actors;
normative pressures are pressures to conform to perceived professional norms. Institutional
actors are thus important in driving the diffusion and adoption of management practices (e.g.
Paauwe & Boselie, 2005) and there are strong sanctions associated with failing to adopt
certain practices (Nelson et al. 2004). However, diffusion and adoption is not only a social
process, since technical, economic, and socio-psychological forces jointly shape the
demand for new practices, and diffusion and adoption of practice is ultimately driven by the
need to respond to organisational performance gaps.
In this case the focus of the theory is on adoption of practices, rather than explaining non-
adoption as we have seen here. For instance, whilst there has clearly been a ‘project
management bandwagon’, the case organisation has taken conscious decisions to ignore it.
This in itself is insightful and provided the identification of a bias that we, the researchers,
had taken into the case. We were researching ‘The Value of Project Management’ – itself
an indication that we (the researchers) believed the practices under that heading were
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valuable. Furthermore, as teachers and consultants, we had a stake in promoting the value
of PM practices. In addition, we had assumed that the case would be about ‘change’, rather
than ‘no-change.’ Lastly, whilst we were regularly exposed to the mimetic, coercive and
normative pressures of external agents of change for organisations, it was wrong to assume
that the managers interviewed were likewise connected.
The organisational learning approach
Another perspective is provided by the organisational learning literature, which accepts that
organisational issues create barriers to learning and improvement. We would suggest that
this perspective is the most useful to help us understand the case presented above. In
particular we draw on the concept of defensive routines (Argyris, 1993) to explain the non-
adoption of promising practices from elsewhere. Organisational defensive routines exist in
both private and governmental organisations, but few studies have been undertaken about
how to overcome them (Argyris, 1993, p.242). Those few that do offer advice seem to
suggest either bypassing the defensive routines and covering up the bypass or else in acting
in ways that actually strengthen the routines rather than get rid of them.
“An organisational defensive routine is any policy or action that inhibits individuals,
groups, inter-groups or organisations from experiencing embarrassment or threat
and at the same time prevents the actors from identifying the causes of
embarrassment or threat. Organisational defensive routines are anti-learning and
over-protective” (Argyris, 1993, p.15).
The immediate effect of such policies, practices and behaviours is to inhibit the detection
and correction of error. A second-order effect is to inhibit problem solving and decision
making. The third order effect is to lower effective organisational performance.
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The case above can be seen as a clear example of this. Despite the embarrassment of
continually being seen to be over budget and behind schedule the situation was allowed to
continue for many years because the organisation refused to experience the
embarrassment. The refusal to become embarrassed by the poor performance led both
sides to ignore the signals. There was complicity in this. This refusal to accept the obvious
inhibited problem solving and decision making. Better to turn a blind eye than to see the
problem because then something would have to be done about it. Better not to hear the
news that things were going badly. Managers commented:
“The company didn’t ask questions because it didn’t want the answers.”
“In a programme that on day 1 was going to fail, the culture was ‘don’t want to hear
bad news’.”
In a study of defensive routines in government, Argyris (1993, p. 19) observed that in
“neither the official policies nor the administrators' espoused values was there
encouragement to deceive, to manipulate or to distort information. Nevertheless, the actions
were robust; they appeared in spite of (and even because of) their deviancy from ideas in
good currency on how to administer governmental agencies.”
In a similar way neither the policies nor the espoused values of the employees and
managers in the company we studied encouraged them to actively deceive, manipulate or
distort information. They simply ignored the information coming from external assessments.
Their denial was robust.
According to Argyris (1993), organisational defensive routines are caused by a circular, self-
reinforcing process in which individuals’ theories in use produce individual strategies of
bypass and cover-up, which reinforce the individuals’ theories in use. Thus the explanation
for organisational defensive routines is both individual and organisational. This means that it
is necessary to change both organisational and individual routines to achieve sustained
change of behaviour. The reform programmes that the company undertook addressed this
18
by creating a standardised approach to project management in the programme so that all
individuals operated in the same way and to the same norms. Our interviews confirmed this
– individuals were pleased (for a very limited time) to adopt the new practices as they could
see benefit from them, and their theories in use became closer to the espoused theories in
the new situation. However, this was not sustained and the mechanism did appear to have
more complexity than previously stated. We therefore sought further explanation of the
causes of these defensive routines.
Other lenses
We note that there are many other lenses that could have been applied to providing
explanation for the phenomenon observed. The punctuated equilibrium model (Gersick,
1991) is one such explanation. In this model, inertia maintains an organisation in
equilibrium, until a major event occurs that requires a change. Once that event has passed,
the state of equilibrium returns, possibly at a different equilibrium point. Lindahl and Rehn
(2007) note that projects, “…despite being generally seen as the most action-oriented way of
organising, are usually conducted under a bureaucratic superstructure based on foundations
of stability, predictability and success” (p.250). They introduce the term ‘yield point’ to
describe the point at which a project goes into crisis to an extent that established protocols
and routines can no longer deal with them. The action required to turn the project back on
track will require a step out of the institutionalised web of intra and inter-organisational rules,
or the rules themselves have to be reformulated and renegotiated. In this case, whether the
bureaucratic superstructure was based on foundations of ‘stability predictability and success’
is doubtful. It is far more likely to have evolved based on custom and practice. The yield
point issue is useful however. It was the publication of the results of an audit of the
performance from an external third party that threw the project into crisis and triggered the
yield point.
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Whilst the punctuated equilibrium model does describe at a high level what we saw
happening in the case, our observed phenomenon concerns ‘lack of change’, rather than
‘change’ per se. In addition, we found interesting the logic(s) present in the improvement
paradox, in the project context.
As we attempted to understand the logics present in the improvement paradox, we noted the
importance of the level of complicity of multiple actors in their reasoning. For this reason we
suggested a ‘theory of complicity’ as a contributor to this understanding.
Towards a ‘theory of complicity’
Having seen that the behaviour being exhibited was not explained by innovation diffusion
theory, was counter-rational to normative views, and was not following the path that a
consideration of institutional theory or fads and fashions would lead us to expect, a partial
explanation was obtained through the examination of the construction and usage of
defensive routines as barriers to organisational learning. This partial explanation is not
satisfactory, however, as it does not address the causes of those barriers. Therefore, for
both theoretical and practical purposes, some further explanation is required.
The data provides evidence of complicity in the performance and rate of change at multiple
levels; between the client and the contracting organisation, between the organisation and
the project, and within the project hierarchy. This complicity is causal to the failure to remove
defensive routines. During the transition phase in 2003, complicity was removed at all levels,
and process improvement took place. Complicity was then re-established and no further
changes were made. The proposition we derive is:
Processes and practices will remain within the defensive routines of the organisation
where there is complicity for them to do so.
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Complicity is an active state achieved where the parties to the complicity collude to allow
it to be so. The state of complicity is evidenced by the statements supporting ‘no
change’ that were made both pre- and post-2003. ‘Active’ indicates that whilst there is
no change, the decision not to change had been consciously made and a rationale built
for this decision. It is causal to the defensive routines.
The limitations of the ‘theory of complicity’
With this proposition in mind, it is appropriate to see if it may have a wider currency. For
instance, there is concern about the level of improvements that are being achieved in project
performance. Standish’s “Chaos” reports chronicle the outcome of IT projects (PM Network,
2003, The Standish Group International Inc., 2004). The project outcomes are also
measured by their completion on time, budget and quality. The TechRepublic Study by the
Gartner Group paints a similar picture. In 2000, 1275 North American IT specialists were
asked about the outcome of internal IT projects in terms of their achievement of time, cost
and quality objectives. The picture is consistently inconsistent – there are some
organisations making great progress with improving process and performance, but the data
from these studies does suggest that there are a considerable number who are making little
progress. We speculate that complicity provides one possible root cause for such a situation,
and that further research would demonstrate if this was in fact the case.
Our thinking about the observed phenomenon led us to speculate whether project contexts
encourage the behaviours we had observed. Indeed we found that studies of mega-projects
in transportation demonstrated that key stakeholders from owner organisations, government
officials and contractors cooperated to use less than best practice project procedures
(Flyvberg et al, 2003).
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However, we also had investigated another ongoing mega-project case where many best
practice/accepted/promising practices had been adopted – the construction of Heathrow’s
Terminal 5 (T5). BAA, the client and owner of Heathrow Airport, implemented a strategic
programme of capability building to improve the management of its projects and in particular
the management of T5, its biggest ever project. They learned from previous projects,
individuals and organisations that contributed to the innovative approach used to manage
the T5 project. Between 2000 and 2002, BAA conducted in-depth analyses of every major
UK construction project (over £1billion) in the previous ten years and on every international
airport that had been opened in the previous ten years. This research showed that none of
them had been delivered on time and within budget or to the quality standards expected.
BAA realised that the only way to deliver T5 was to change the rules of the game by creating
a set of behaviours that allowed people to come up with innovative solutions to problems.
Not only did BAA learn internally from its past projects, but it learnt externally as well from
other airport projects, from other sectors and leading-edge practice in supply chain
management and project management (Davies et al 2006). This exposure to the external
environment (previously termed ‘searching’) and the resulting analysis removed possible
complicity from a substantial part of the project.
At the time this was heralded as a great success and an example of a breakthrough
innovation in project management. However, a year later the terminal opening was
described as a national disaster when multiple problems emerged that resulted in the
cancellation of numerous flights and thousands of pieces of baggage being separated from
their owners. So here was another paradox: how does a major success become a major
failure almost overnight?
The improvement paradox in project contexts
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We had observed a paradox in our case study – what we saw now was that paradoxes were
more commonplace in project contexts than in just our original case. For instance, it is one
of the paradoxes that the project form of organisation is lauded as the one most likely to
deliver innovative solutions whilst at the same time being resistant to changes in its own
structure and processes. O’Neill et al (1988) suggest that organisations operating in highly
uncertain environments need to be extremely flexible and able to adapt and change their
practices rapidly to meet the demands of a changing environment. This would imply the
rapid adoption of good or best practice was a necessary factor for survival (depending on
the level of competition in the market). Thus one would expect project-based organisations,
which typically work in an unstable and uncertain environment, to be flexible and open to
rapid adoption of new practices. Our case is certainly not unique in demonstrating the
opposite – what we have termed the improvement paradox.
Conclusions
This paper began with the identification of an observed phenomenon, that we termed ‘the
improvement paradox.’ It occurred in a project-based organisation that was apparently in
urgent need of improving its PM practices and performance. Whilst the need was evident,
this wasn’t matched by activity within the organisation to implement improvements. Only
when the organisation reached a crisis were limited changes implemented. It then returned
to a state where no further changes were likely. Such a scenario is not that unusual and is
well documented in the change management literature. However, we were concerned that
whilst this helped provide a description of what we had seen, it didn’t provide greater
understanding of this paradox in this context.
The existence of the paradox was the result of two logical processes coming to different
conclusions on the scenario. One logic was that of the researcher. Using Harvey’s (1988)
terms, we ‘uncovered the aberrant logic’ in our initial assumption of the inherent goodness
and desirability of improving PM practices. Indeed, the bias towards ‘organisations self-
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evidently must want to adopt promising / best / accepted practices’ is widespread. Moreover,
we (the researchers) are actors in an external environment that actively promotes
improvement, and provides mimetic, coercive and normative pressures on an organisation to
improve. The organisation, through complicity, had insulated itself from these pressures.
This meant that the logic of the defensive routine prevailed. It was only when an external
report caused a crisis in the project organisation that the complicity was temporarily lifted,
the routines were suspended, and change could be made.
Project environments may be particularly susceptible to complicity, and this may contribute
to understanding why the performance of organisations in project terms is so variable, and
headline rates of performance demonstrate only limited improvements. Contrary to the
literature, project environments, which are full of uncertainty, do not appear to be the locus
of rapid adoption of new practice. We further suggest that this is due in part to the desire for
stability in an uncertain environment. Where the technology is uncertain or where
relationships with stakeholders are uncertain then project members seek stability in the
processes they use. There is in-built desire not to ‘rock the boat.’ Even when crises arise
that force a change, the change in underlying behaviour is only temporary, followed by a
return to old ways of working. New defensive routines emerge to replace the old ones. It
takes an enormous effort to make sustainable changes in this environment. The T5 project
appeared to offer hope that such sustainable change in behaviour may be possible given the
right environment. But, in another paradox, the good behaviours and practices that had
served the project so well in the construction phase seemed to be abandoned as it moved
into operation.
So, in starting with one paradox in a single project we have unearthed several others. We
tried a number of theoretical lenses to try to make sense of the paradox. By itself each
approach was inadequate to explain what we had observed. The combination of the ‘theory
of complicity’, which led to the defensive routines we had witnessed, combined with our own
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bias as researchers, did provide a credible explanation.
As we seek more intricate explanations for the phenomena we observe in project contexts
perhaps we should try to adopt strategies based on the paradox framework. In our own
continuing efforts to better understand the paradoxes we have come across, there is indeed
some notion that whilst they don’t provide ‘the way forward’, at least they do provide a clue
to a way forward.
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